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TAXATION OF PREPAID INCOME
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE TAX TREATMENT
OF PREPAID INCOME"
By MURRAY H. ROTHAUS*
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides, as have
previous Codes, that taxable income shall be computed in
accordance with the method of accounting regularly em-
ployed by the taxpayer in keeping his books.' On its face
this appears to be a quite clear provision, but its applica-
tion over the years has been the source of considerable
litigation. This article will cover one area of that litiga-
tion - the tax treatment of prepaid income by an accrual
basis taxpayer.
The accounting profession has strenuously contended
that accepted accounting procedures for handling prepaid
income should be followed for tax purposes. However, the
Internal Revenue Service has taken the position that such
advanced payments represent income in the year of receipt
and will be taxed in that year in spite of the method of
accounting used. Through an analysis of legislative back-
ground and cases on the problem, an attempt will be made
in this article to show that this position is legally unjustifi-
able and lacks sufficiently compelling reasons to justify its
continuance.
This problem is still of particular importance today, for
with the repeal of section 452 of the 1954 Code, dealing with
prepaid income, the principles of law which would have
been applicable if section 452 had never been passed, were
reestablished. The Treasury Department has indicated
that it would not consider the repeal of section 452 as any
indication of Congressional intent as to the proper treat-
ment of prepaid income items or as the acceptance or re-
jection of any judicial decision.2
I. LEGISLATIvE BACKGROUND
An examination of the revenue acts and their legisla-
tive history would seem to establish an adequate basis for
the proposition that the method of handling prepaid income
advocated by the accounting profession was the method
provided for and intended.
* Of the Baltimore City Bar; B.S., Johns Hopkins University, 1953, LL.B.,
Harvard Law School, 1956.
t ED. NoTm: See Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner, 25 L. W.
4247 (U. S. Sup. Ct., April 22, 1957), appearing as this issue went to press.
1 §446.
Sec. 452 repealed June 15, 1953, C. 143, §1(a), 69 Stat. 134 [26 U. S. C. A.
23 (1956)] ; H. R. Rep. No. 293, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1955).
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The first major act was the Revenue Act of 1913.1 It
was based wholly on the cash receipts and disbursements
method and was quickly found to be completely inadequate
for businesses of any complexity. As a result, Congress, in
the Revenue Act of 1916,' provided for the use of the ac-
crual method of accounting at the option of the taxpayer.
The report of the Committee on Ways and Means stated:
"As two systems of bookkeeping are in use in the
United States, one based on the cash or receipts basis
and the other on the accrual basis, it was deemed advis-
able to provide in the proposed measure that an in-
dividual or a corporation may make a return on either
the cash or accrual basis, if the basis selected clearly
reflects the income."
This statement was given expression in sections 8(g) and
13(d) of the act, which provided for making returns on the
same basis on which the taxpayer kept his accounts, and
Regulation 33, Article 127,6 recognized as acceptable bases
all methods in accord with approved standard accounting
practices. Here then, the basis was laid for the use of such
standard practices, which, under the accrual method, meant
the spreading of prepaid income over the period for which
the services were to be rendered.
This adoption of approved standard accounting methods
was given judicial recognition in the case of United States
v. Anderson. The Supreme Court, in commenting upon
section 13(d) of the 1916 Act, stated that its purpose was
to enable taxpayers to keep their books and make their
returns according to scientific accounting principles.
The Revenue Act of 19188 continued the recognition of
the accrual method, but made it mandatory for the tax-
payer to compute income on the same basis on which his
books were kept, provided such method clearly reflected
338 Stat. 166.
' 39 Stat. 756; George 0. May in his article Accounting and the Account-
ant in the Administration of Income Taxation, 47 Col. L. Rev. 377, 380-381
(1947), states that the change was also due to the report of a group of
businessmen and economists who felt that the determination of Income for
a particular period was essentially an accounting problem and that account-
ing methods which had been adopted and consistently followed should be
accepted as clearly reflecting Income; and that these convictions were ex-
pressed in the Revenue Acts of 1916 and 1918 and the Regulations under
them.5 H. R. Rep. No. 922, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1916).
U. S. Treas. Reg. 33 (Revised), Art. 127 (1918).
269 U. S. 422, 440 (1926).
§212(b), 40 Stat. 1064.
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the income. This act appears to have considerably strength-
ened the proposition that the approach used by the account-
ants should be followed. Firstly, there was the continued
recognition of approved methods of accounting and then
the additional recognition that such methods clearly reflect
income Secondly, there appeared to be specific authority
for not including an item in income when received, pro-
vided the method of accounting in use provided for its in-
clusion as of a different period." If there was any doubt
under the Revenue Act of 1916 that by authorizing the
accrual method the deferral of prepaid income was also
authorized, it would certainly have seemed foreclosed in
view of the specificity of the added provisions of the Reve-
nue Act of 1918.
The language of the pertinent sections of the Revenue
Act of 1918 and the regulations under it have been repeated
almost verbatim in all the subsequent tax statutes includ-
ing the Internal Revenue Code of 1954." It would seem,
therefore, that the accounting approach would have been
the one used throughout this entire period, for nowhere in
the law or regulations is there any indication that any other
approach was intended. However, as will be seen from the
cases discussed in the next section, a lack of understanding
of the niceties of accounting concepts and a blanket of legal
theories resulted in a complete divorce of prepaid income
from the accepted accounting treatment.
II. JUDICIAL BACKGROUND
In analyzing the decisions in this area, it may be noted
that they fall naturally into two periods with the dividing
line at 1934. The cases prior to this date discussed the tax-
payer's accounting method and the procedure for handling
prepaid income under it, while the cases after 1934 ignored
the question of the accounting method and based the de-
cision on the "claim of right" doctrine. Although the courts
generally refused to follow the accounting approach in
both periods, it is only in the first period that one finds any
expression by the courts or the Commissioner that the
accounting approach might be permissible for tax purposes.
9U. S. Treas. Reg. 45, Art. 23 (1919), provided that standard methods
of accounting will ordinarily be regarded as clearly reflecting income.
10§213(a), 40 Stat. 1057, provided for inclusion in the year of receipt
unless under the method of accounting in use it was to be accounted for
in a different period and U. S. Treas. Reg. 45, Art. 22 (1919), provided that
the method of accounting in use was to be followed with respect to the time
as of which items of income were to be accounted for.§§446, 451.
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Afterwards, the claim of right doctrine became all power-
ful, and any contentions based on the taxpayer's account-
ing method were given little recognition. Thus, it is only
through the cases prior to 1934 that any insight may be
gotten as to the reason for the courts' refusal to follow the
accounting approach, and the only apparent reason was a
failure to understand accounting concepts.
A. Period up to 1934. The first major case in the pre-
1934 period is that of Automobile Underwriters, Inc. 2 In
this case one may observe a fine example of faulty reason-
ing resulting from a lack of understanding. The taxpayer
kept its books on the accrual basis and claimed therefore
that its advance subscriptions should be spread over the
period covered by the membership. The court decided that
the case was governed by Section 213 of the Revenue Acts
of 1918 and 1921, but disallowed the deferral on the basis
of Black's Law Dictionary definition of accruing. The court
should have referred to the procedures for inclusion under
the method of accounting in use, as was provided by section
213, rather than referring to a law dictionary definition
which has nothing at all to do with accounting concepts.
The court not only failed to understand accounting con-
cepts, but also disregarded the statutory language which
they had decided covered the case.
Another example of judicial blindness in this period is
the opinion in United States v. Boston & Providence R.R.
Corporation,"' covering an advanced rental situation. The
disallowance of deferral was based on the authority of the
O'Day Investment Co."4 case, in which the reason for re-
quiring inclusion of an advanced rent payment as income
in the year of receipt was the fact that the taxpayer ac-
counted on the cash basis. To suppose that such a case is
proper authority for the proposition that the tax statutes
do not permit an accrual basis taxpayer to defer a prepaid
item ignores both the distinction between the cash basis
and the accrual basis and the statutory recognition of ac-
crual accounting as an acceptable method of determining
income.
In Creasey Corporation v. Helburn," the court simply
misstated the accrual method of accounting. The taxpayer
had received payments on contracts under which he was
obligated to perform services for periods from ten to fifty
19 B. T. A. 1160 (1930).
"37 F. 2d 670 (Ist Cir., 1930).
U 13 B. T. A. 1230 (1928).
"57 F. 2d 204 (W. D. Ky., 1932).
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years and he contended that they should not be included
in income as they represented capital investments. The
Commissioner required the payments to be included in in-
come, and, recognizing that the taxpayer was on the accrual
basis, authorized these advance payments to be spread
over the respective terms of the contracts. The court agreed
that these payments were income, but declared that the
Commissioner had no authority to permit a deferral: "I
have never understood that, under the accrual method of
keeping books, income actually received in one year may
be, in part, projected into and allotted to future years."1
It is difficult to imagine a more complete ignorance of the
accrual accounting concept that an item is included in in-
come in the period when earned, not when received.
Thus far we have seen a consistent refusal by the courts
to allow a deferral of prepaid income. This refusal, how-
ever, has been based on the clearly erroneous reasoning
that the accrual method did not encompass deferrals, with
no reference to the issue of whether deferrals are permis-
sible for tax purposes. It would seem, however, that the
deferral of prepaid income would be held permissible for
tax purposes as soon as the courts realized that such de-
ferrals are basic to the accrual method, since they did recog-
nize the propriety of use of the accrual method as such.
Several courts, recognizing these fundamentals, would have
allowed the taxpayer to spread the receipt were it not
for other factors. In Bradstreet Company of Maine,17 the
taxpayer received subscription fees for services to be ren-
dered over a period of years. The court disallowed the de-
ferral because the company's books were kept so inade-
quately that they could not tell what method of accounting
it followed or what portion of the receipts, if any, should
be deferred. The court, however, expressing an under-
standing of the accrual method said:
"We agree that if a proper portion of the total sub-
scriptions could be deferred, income would be more
clearly reflected . . . [but] In order to give the peti-
tioner any relief, some method of accounting which
would enable a proper allocation to be made or would
at least be an improvement upon the method used in
keeping its books and adopted by the Commissioner
would have to be devised."'"
"Ibid, 206.
17 23 B. T. A. 1093 (1931).
8 Ibid, 1099, 1102.
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A case of similar import is Jennings & Co. v. Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue. 9 The taxpayer here received
a lump sum payment on a lease which stated that the pay-
ment should not be applied on rent to be paid in the future
and that it is fully earned by the lessor on execution. The
court required this receipt to be included in income in the
year of execution even though the taxpayer kept his books
on the accrual method. This result was based on the word-
ing of the lease, but the important part of the decision for
our purposes is the consideration by the court as to the pro-
cedure that would have been allowable in the absence of
such wording. They indicated that, in the absence of such
wording, the petitioner's contention that the lump sum be
spread over the term of the lease would have been entitled
to consideration in light of section 213 of the Revenue Act
of 1921 and that the payments might well be regarded in
view of approved standard methods of accounting as pre-
paid rentals which are properly apportionable to the respec-
tive years to which such payments by the terms of the
lease are related.
These two cases go several steps beyond the previous
group. They recognize the deferral of prepaid income as
part of the accrual method, and further, they indicate that
such a deferral would generally be permissible for tax
purposes.
As of 1934 then, the state of the law was somewhat
uncertain. All the decisions had recognized the accrual
method of accounting as permissible for income determina-
tion, but the issue of whether a taxpayer on the accrual
method could defer income to periods other than the year
of receipt was not unalterably settled.
B. Period from 1934 to present. In the period after
1934, the courts switched to an entirely different basis for
their decisions on prepaid income. This change was brought
about by the development of the claim of right doctrine in
1932 in the case of North American Oil v. Burnet0 and
from that date forward this doctrine has been used as the
basis for the decisions in the majority, if not all, of the
cases involving prepaid income. The North American case
was concerned with the proper year for reporting the net
profits of a business on the accrual basis, when the tax-
payer's right to these net profits was involved in litigation.
The Supreme Court held that the net profits were in-
cludible in income in the year the taxpayer first received
59 F. 2d 32 (9th Cir., 1932).
286 U. S. 417 (1932).
[VOL. XVII
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them by virtue of a District Court decision in its favor,
though such decision was open to possible reversal on
appeal. The basis of this holding was the claim of right
doctrine which was stated as follows:
"If a taxpayer receives earnings under a claim of
right and without restriction as to its disposition, he
has received income which he is required to return,
even though it may still be claimed that he is not en-
titled to retain the money, and even though he may still
be adjudged liable to restore its equivalent."21
The North American case did not itself involve a pre-
paid income situation, but the doctrine of the case was used
just two years later in Brown v. Helvering,22 a case which
has been consistently cited as the authority for applying
the claim of right doctrine to prepaid income situations.
Here the taxpayer had received overriding commissions on
insurance policies which were to run for a period of years,
and the Commissioner had required their inclusion in in-
come in the year of receipt. The taxpayer made two con-
tentions: first, that he should be allowed a deduction from
the commissions received, as his experience indicated that
a certain portion of these receipts would have to be re-
turned in later years due to cancellation of some of the
policies; second, that if such a deduction is not permissible,
the commissions should be prorated over the life of the
policy and reported as earned. The court rejected both of
these contentions, but for our purposes the second is more
important. The reasons given by the court for rejecting
this contention were that this method of accounting for the
commissions had never been used by the taxpayer, and
that there was no proof that the commissions contained
any element of compensation for service to be rendered in
future years. Nowhere in the court's consideration of this
second contention is there any mention or even an indica-
tion that the basis for rejection was the claim of right doc-
trine. The true basis of the rejection was that the commis-
sions were not really prepaid income, and therefore, there
was no reason to allow their deferral to later years.
It was only in the rejection of the first contention that
the court used the claim of right doctrine. Here, as in the
North American case, the taxpayer had received funds with
a possibility that some part of the funds may have to be
Ibid, 424.291 U. S. 193 (1934).
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given up, and therefore, the court used the doctrine as the
basis for denying any deduction. This is just an illustra-
tion of a different application of the claim of right doc-
trine and goes no further than the decision in the North
American case. It should, however, have no effect on the
right of a taxpayer to allocate this receipt which the court
has determined to be income. This is borne out by the
fact that the court considered the right to allocate as a
separate and distinct problem. If the factor of future ser-
vices had no bearing under the claim of right doctrine,
there would have been no reason for the court to deal with
the point. Factual proof would have been unimportant,
since it would not have been controling. Therefore, any
citation of the Brown case as authority for the proposition
that the claim of right doctrine precludes the deferral of
prepaid income or that deferral of prepaid income is not
permissible for tax purposes would appear to be incorrect.
Nevertheless, the cases since 1934 have consistently
cited the claim of right doctrine and the Brown case as
authority for denying the deferral of prepaid income.23 If
one accepts the Brown case as being an inadequate au-
thority, then it would follow that all relying upon the
Brown case, have been incorrectly decided. However, in
view of the great number of these decisions, it is necessary
to determine as an independent proposition whether the
claim of right doctrine is a correct basis for denying de-
ferrals of prepaid income. An examination of the major
claim of right cases clearly leads to a negative answer.
Firstly, the claim of right doctrine was meant to apply
only where earnings and net profits" were involved. In
the North American case the court was concerned with the
net profits of a business. The only issue involved was the
determination of the time when these net profits had
reached the status of income to the business. Further, the
wording of the claim of right doctrine is in terms of earn-
ings - if a taxpayer receives earnings under a claim of
right. Coupling this with the fact that the court was deal-
ing with net profits and that in citing the doctrine they re-
ferred to the case of Board v. Commissioner of Internal
2 See South Dade Farms, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 138
F. 2d S18 (5th Cir., 1943) ; National Airlines, Inc., 9 T. C. 159 (1947) ; Your
Health Club, Inc., 4 T. C. 385 (1944) ; Automobile Club of Michigan, 20
T. C. 1033 (1953).
2A Earnings and profits are used here in the accounting sense, that is,
arising when all the services connected with the sum of money have already
been rendered. Under this view a prepayment is not earnings or profits.
[VOL. XVII
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Revenue 5 where the amounts in issue were net profits, this
contention becomes very strong.
The other claim of right cases follow this pattern. The
decisions of the various circuits" prior to the Brown case
applied the doctrine only to receipts for which nothing
further remained to be done by the taxpayer, and when
citing the doctrine always used the terms profits, income,
or earnings, and not receipts. The later Supreme court
cases are of similar import. Brown v. Helvering has already
been discussed. The others27 all involved the question of
whether the receipt has reached a sufficient degree of
ownership so as to be considered income and all the re-
ceipts involved were already earnings or net profits.
Then too, there is a considerable distinction between
the issue involved in the claim of right cases and the issue
involved in the prepaid income cases. In the claim of right
cases the question was whether the disability connected
with the receipt, such as the possibility of its having to be
returned, was enough to prevent the receipt from being
considered income. In other words, was the taxpayer's
ownership of the receipt substantial enough to have it con-
sidered income to him. In the prepaid income cases, there
is no dispute as to the taxpayer's ownership of the receipt
and the only question is whether the inclusion in income
can be deferred. If there is no dispute as to the fact that
the receipt is income, then there is no reason to apply the
claim of right doctrine, for it does not answer the question
of whether the receipt can be deferred.
Thirdly, is it correct to say in a prepaid income situa-
tion that the taxpayer has received a payment without any
restriction as to its disposition? For a company just start-
ing business this is certainly not correct. The funds re-
ceived will be needed to cover the expenses incurred in
performing its obligation, so it can not use the funds as it
pleases. The well established firms may also be under a
restriction as to the use of these receipts. The firm must
keep a fixed amount of funds available in order to be able
to perform and thus may have to set aside some of these
receipts to meet this requirement. Further, in the prepaid
income situation there is a stronger restriction attached to
2151 F. 2d 73 (6th Cir., 1931).
0 See Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. R. J. Darnell, Inc., 60 F. 2d
82 (6th Cir., 1932) ; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Brooklyn Union
Gas Co., 62 F. 2d 505 (2d Cir., 1933); Blum v. Helvering, 74 F. 2d 482
(C. A. D. C., 1934).
United States v. Lewis, 340 U. S. 590 (1951) ; Healy v. Commissioner,
345 U. S. 278 (1953).
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the receipt, for the taxpayer becomes subject to a fixed and
certain liability immediately on receipt, while in the other
claim of right cases the liability was at best contingent.
Therefore, it would seem that the claim of right doctrine
would not be a correct basis for these decisions. If we
accept this proposition and the fact that the Brown case is
an inadequate authority, it becomes apparent that the
whole line of prepaid income cases is incorrectly decided
and entitled to little weight. Here, as in the pre-1934 period,
the courts used a clearly erroneous basis to preclude de-
ferrals but it can no longer be said that from a practical
standpoint, there is any lack of clarity as to how prepaid
income may be treated, tax-wise.
III. ANALYSIS OF CouRT AND TREASURY
TREATMENT
Thus far the analysis has been limited to a discussion of
the reasoning advanced by the courts as the basis for their
decisions. The discussion in this section will carry the
analysis beyond that point and will consider the ramifica-
tion of these decisions and further criticisms.
The refusal of the Treasury Department to adopt the
accounting approach produces many unfair and distorted
results. Perhaps the most blatant arises when the tax treat-
ment of prepaid income is combined with tax treatment of
prepaid expenses. The case of Renwick v. United Statese8
is a particularly good illustration. Although the taxpayer
here was on the cash basis, the same result would have
been reached for an accrual basis taxpayer. The taxpayer
had received an advance payment on a ninety-nine year
lease, and in the same year had paid a commission to the
broker for securing the lease. The court in accordance with
standard tax practice held that the commission could not
be deducted in the year paid, but had to be spread equally
over the entire term of the lease, and at the same time held
that the advance rental had to be included in income that
year, despite the admitted unfairness and distortion which
this produced.
Even though there may not be a combination of prepaid
income and prepaid expense in one transaction as above,
the different tax treatment of these two items seems clearly
inconsistent. The reason advanced for requiring the spread
of prepaid expenses is that to allow the taxpayer to deduct
the full amount in one year may result in the distortion of
28S7 F. 2d 123 (7th Cir., 19,16).
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his income and cause a payment of either more or less
taxes than proper.29 Prepaid income is just the other side
of the coin, and this sort of reasoning seems just as appli-
cable to it. An inclusion of the full amount of the receipt
in one year can bring about the same distorted result. Then
too, this difference in treatment violates any consistency
in the tax structure. At present the party making the pay-
ment must prorate the amount over the period covered
while the party receiving the payment must include the
full amount in income in the year received. A more bal-
anced rule is to have the parties on both sides of the trans-
action receive the same treatment.
Another indication of the unfairness of the present tax
treatment arises from a consideration of the undue tax
burden imposed thereby. Since the taxpayer must report
the income in the year of receipt without being able to
claim the benefit of related deductible expenses, if in the
later years the revenues are small, as may very likely be
the case since he has already received a large part of the
money due him, he will not be able to get full tax advan-
tage of these related deductions. Also, by bunching the
receipts in one taxable year, the taxpayer may be pushed
into a higher tax bracket and thereby be required to pay an
aggregate tax that is greater than if he had reported the
income as it was earned. However, even though there is
no increase in the aggregate taxes, by imposing the tax on
advance receipts, the taxpayer is deprived during the in-
tervening period of the amount of taxes attributable to the
related deductible expenses. It has been suggested that this
latter result has been partially responsible for the failure of
certain businesses."
Analysis of the post-1934 decisions indicates that the
courts have ignored the "unless" clause of section 451 (a) 81
which provides that an item of gross income can be ac-
Security Mills Co. v. Comm'r., 321 U. S. 281, 285 (1944).
8 Prepaid Income and Reserves for Estimated Expenses, Hearings Before
Committee on Ways and Means of the House, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 140
(1955) ; This was the statement of Frank J. Moch on the television and
electronic service companies. To illustrate the effect of the present law he
referred to the year 1950 when the service business was good, and the com-
panies therefore assumed larger contract obligations on a prepaid basis.
This large income placed the companies in a higher tax bracket and they
paid taxes on the full amount received. Thus when 1951 turned out to be
a poor year, these companies found themselves saddled with large con-
tract obligations and no funds. The Government had 'taken its share in
advance which deprived them of some funds, and being firms of limited
capital, they had no reserves on which to draw. Thus, they found them-
selves unable to perform and were forced out of business.
SInt. Rev. Code of 1954.
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counted for in a period other than the year of receipt.
Although by its terms this clause covers the prepaid in-
come situation perfectly, the courts have not taken it
directly into consideration in determining the appropriate
tax treatment. The allowance of a deferral under this
clause would not seem to violate the overall requirement
of clearly reflecting income,32 and thus make the clause in-
applicable, but rather, in view of the fact that approved
standard methods of accounting are ordinarily regarded as
clearly reflecting income, and the deferral of prepaid in-
come is such an approved method, and the fact that only
by deferring the receipt can a matching of revenues and
expenses be brought about, it would seem that any other
treatment would distort income. The courts in deciding
the prepaid income cases have not really examined this
point as an independent proposition. The decisions that a
deferral did not clearly reflect income, have been based
solely on the previous conclusion that a prepayment is
required to be included in income in the year of receipt.3
That is, once they had decided that a prepayment is re-
quired to be reported in the year of receipt, it followed that
no other method of reporting would clearly reflect income.
Thus, if it were decided that the "unless" clause did sanc-
tion the deferral of prepaid income the issue of whether
this method of reporting clearly reflected income would be
an open question.
Looking at the problem another way, the judicial re-
quirement of inclusion in income in the year of receipt puts
the taxpayer on a cash basis as to this item and thereby
creates a hybrid system of accounting. Prior to the 1954
Code, the statutes did not sanction the use of hybrid
systems,3" so it can be argued that the courts have been
flouting statutory language, as well as the professionally
desirable element of consistency. Once the taxpayer has
adopted a method of accounting, he is required to be con-
sistent in his use of the method. As long as the taxpayer is
held to this standard, it would be appropriate for the courts
to require the commissioner to be consistent in his treat-
ment of the method used.
Finally there are several policy considerations that
should be pointed out. There appears to have been but one
exception to the Internal Revenue Service's policy of re-
Ibid, §446.
See South Tacoma Motor Co., 3 T. C. 411 (1944) ; Automobile Club of
Michigan, 20 T. C. 1033 (1953).
" Security Mills Co. v. Comm'r., 8ipra. 2. 25.
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quiring the whole payment to be included in the year of
receipt. This is IT 3369" which permits publishing con-
cerns to prorate their subscriptions for each year over the
period of the subscription. Limiting this favorable treat-
ment to just one type of business concern is highly dis-
criminatory. There are many other types of concerns hav-
ing the same sort of income problems, and the Internal
Revenue Service has not offered any justification for the
limited scope of this exception.
The administration of the income tax program depends
largely, if not entirely, on accounting practices, and in fact
it may be said that without accounting a workable adminis-
tration would be impossible. Further, business practices
and policies are guided and determined to a large extent
by accounting practices, and when the tax rules follow
these practices they are understood and accepted. A diverg-
ence causes considerable difficulty and necessitates such
things as double sets of books and elaborate reconciliations.
It is recognized, however, that in certain areas there must
be a divergence for policy or administrative reasons; but
as will be brought out in the following section, there
appears to be no adequate justification in the prepaid in-
come area.
IV. JusTmcATioN OF THE CouvR AND
TREAsTRY TREATAnT
Several reasons have been advanced as justification for
the present tax handling of prepaid income, but none ap-
pears adequate.
The first of these may be labelled as the concern for the
security of the revenue. By levying the tax as soon as the
taxpayer has the funds, the Government has no need to
worry about insolvency or bankruptcy preventing tax col-
lection as it may if the inclusion in income is deferred to
later years. Although this by itself is a justifiable motive,
the problems of collection and enforcement should be mat-
ters entirely distinct from the issue of what is income.
Further, the application of such a policy to all taxpayers
seems unrealistic in that, as a practical matter, the larger
portion of prepayments is received by the more reliable
business concerns, organizations beyond the worry of in-
solvency. Even if a bankruptcy occurs, the Government is
a priority creditor.s0 If the Commissioner in a particular
case feels that the taxpayer may be unable to pay his taxes,
111940 Cum. Bull. 46.
"The Bankruptcy Act §64, 30 Stat. 563 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. §104 (1953).
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bonds and jeopardy assessments provide means for protect-
ing the revenue. Aside from such irregularities, taxation is
a continuing process which will eventually catch all income.
Another reason advanced in support of the Treasury
position is that, by allowing the deferral of prepaid income,
tax liability would depend on a matter of judgment which
might be influenced by the amount of taxes to be paid.
There would be considerable merit to this contention, were
it not for the fact that the accounting theory and practices
concerning prepaid income are so well developed. To a
certain extent the allocation is based on estimates or judg-
ment, but the practice is so uniform and consistent that the
differences in result would be of little consequence. Then,
too, once the judgment has been exercised, the taxpayer
would be bound to follow it, so that over a period of years
everything would balance out. A large income in one year
would be offset by a smaller income in a later year. Fur-
ther, all that has happened as a result of this unsatisfactory
treatment is to have the taxpayer exercise his judgment
at a different point of time. The taxpayer will control the
timing of the receipts or set up various kinds of arrange-
ments and will accomplish the same result as if the Trea-
sury had allowed the deferral in the first place. A resort to
such devices compels the transactions to be set up in a
manner which is highly undesirable and inconvenient from
an economic viewpoint.
A third basis for the Treasury's position is that it sim-
plifies the administrative process. No one will dispute this;
but carrying it to its natural conclusion it becomes hard to
justify the adoption of the accrual method as an acceptable
basis, for the cash method is certainly the best from the
viewpoint of ease of administration. Further, this type
of contention should not really be determinative. In fact
we have seen that the Treasury itself requires the deferral
of items, such as prepaid expenses, illustrating that the
primary concern is not administrative ease, when a clear
reflection of income is involved. In addition to this, vari-
ous sections of the 1954 Code such as 1301, 1302, 1303,
1341 and 1342, evidence that there is much less concern to-
day over the individuality of each tax period.
It must be conceded that each of the above contentions
has some merit; but in view of the inequities of the present
tax treatment, together they should not be considered
strong enough to uphold the present treatment or to pre-
clude a change.
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TAXATION OF PREPAID INCOME
V. PRESNT STATUS AND EXPECTATIONS
Although reason demands a reversal of the present law
by the courts, there is considerable doubt whether such a
change will be effected by judicial decision. The case law
is frozen and the courts will undoubtedly be reluctant to
overrule all this precedent. A ray of hope appeared in
Beacon Publishing Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Rev.,"
which not only allowed the taxpayer to defer prepaid in-
come, but also indicated that such a deferral is generally
proper. However, the effect of the decision may be consid-
erably weakened by the fact that section 452 of the 1954
Code was in effect at this time. Although that section did
not cover the years involved in this decision, the court may
have used the policy of the section as evidence of what has
always been the Congressional intent as to prepaid income
in deciding the case. In addition, two subsequent tax court
cases38 refused to accept the Beacon case as a change of
tide precedent. In both of these cases the Beason case was
referred to and not followed, on the basis that it was
clearly contrary to settled law. There is one certain result
of the Beacon case, though. It has produced a sound reason
for Supreme Court review of the problem on certiorari,
since there is now a conflict in the decisions of the circuit
courts.
Congress in the 1954 Code attempted to correct the situ-
ation by the addition of Section 452 which with certain limi-
tations permitted accrual basis taxpayers to defer prepaid
income. However, at the insistence of the Secretary of the
Treasury this section was retroactively repealed in June
1955.11 There was considerable doubt whether the repeal
of this section was justifiable, 0 but Congress nevertheless
bowed to the Secretary's fears. But the issue is not dead.
Congress has now definitely taken the position that the de-
ferral of prepaid income should be allowed. Both the House
and Senate Committees indicated in their reports that new
legislation on this problem would be taken under consider-
ation, and the House in fact adopted a resolution requesting
further study on the problem with an eye to new legisla-
tion as soon as possible.41
-218 F. 2d 697 (10th Cir., 1955) ; certiorari not applied for.
18 Curtis R. Andrews, 23 T. C. 1026 (1955) ; E. W. Schuessler, 24 T. C. 247
(1955).
19 Pub. L. No. 74, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. §1(a), (b) (June, 1955).
0 See Prepaid Income and Reserves for Estimated Expenses, Hearings
Before Committee on Finance of the Senate, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 37, 72,
77 (1955).
41 H. R. Rep. No. 293 and S. Rep. No. 372, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
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It can be expected that when Congress adopts new legis-
lation, it will follow fairly closely the wording and intent
of section 452 of the 1954 Code. Allowing the Internal
Revenue Service to amend the regulations so as to permit
deferrals would not be satisfactory. Perhaps the most seri-
ous drawback is that such would give the taxpayer a free
hand in an area with which the Service has had no experi-
ence and thereby create a considerable number of adminis-
trative problems. From the viewpoint of security of the
revenue, this approach is certainly not acceptable. Tax-
payers would be able to defer the reporting of income for
a number of years and the Treasury would have to share
the risk of insolvency or bankruptcy throughout the whole
period. Although the courts would be able to fill in this
flexibility somewhat, it would still be a considerable length
of time before any definite practice became established.
As a result of these objections, the approach that most
likely will be taken is the adoption of a specific section
similar to section 452. This section probably would have
adequately served the needs of both the Treasury and the
taxpayer. The limitation to five years served as a protec-
tive device for the Treasury, as it cut down the period over
which income could be deferred and thereby the possible
loss of revenue. Also, the section established a definite
method of handling so that too many administrative prob-
lems could not arise. For the taxpayer, the limitation to
five years probably was not too serious as the majority of
prepayments probably do not exceed five years. Further, if
there was a transaction requiring different treatment, the
taxpayer could always appeal to the Secretary for consent
to a different handling.
It appears then that there is adequate basis for assum-
ing that Congress will adopt a specific statutory section
alleviating the problem as soon as possible. Although the
taxpayer is today still faced with the same problem, the
future may bring the relief long overdue.
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